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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant Johnny Watson alleges that he was r emoved 
from his position of Account Executive at Eastman Kodak 
Company ("Kodak") because of unlawful race and age 
discrimination. Under federal law, a complainant has 300 
days from the date of the adverse employment decision to 
file a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC"). In Delaware State College v. Ricks, 
449 U.S. 250 (1980), the Supreme Court held that an 
adverse employment action occurs, and the statute of 
limitations therefore begins to run, at the time the 
employee receives notice of that action and ter mination is 
a delayed but inevitable result. Relying on Ricks, the 
District Court measured the limitations period from the 
date on which Watson was notified of his termination from 
the Account Executive position, and dismissed W atson's 
claim as untimely. Watson asserts that Ricks's date of 
notification rule does not control the limitations period in 
his case because Kodak left open the possibility of Watson's 
continued employment with the company. We disagree. 
Because we concur with the District Court that the r elevant 
date from which to measure the timeliness of Watson's 
discrimination claim is the date on which he was r emoved 
from the Account Executive position, and because we 
conclude that the mere speculative possibility of continued 
employment does not alter Ricks's date of notification rule, 
we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Johnny Watson began working for Kodak in 1979, and 
was promoted in 1988 to the position of Account Executive. 
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He alleges that in that capacity he consistently met his 
sales quotas and received several employment awards, 
including five 100% club awards and one master club 
award for reaching 140% of his sales quota. He also 
reportedly received favorable perfor mance evaluations and 
was not subject to any disciplinary action. 
 
In December 1994, Watson transferred to Kodak's office 
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where he was the only African- 
American Account Executive. Roger Gagnon was his 
immediate supervisor. Watson alleges that, from the outset, 
Gagnon interfered with his perfor mance by refusing to 
provide support comparable to what he of fered younger, 
white Account Executives. According to W atson, Gagnon's 
interference prevented him fr om meeting his sales quotas 
for 1995 and 1996. 
 
In January 1997, Watson wrote a letter to Gagnon 
complaining about these matters and contending that race 
discrimination was the reason for that lack of support. 
Gagnon responded in a letter dated February 4, 1997, 
informing Watson that, due to poor per formance, he was 
retroactively removed from his Account Executive 
classification effective January 1, 1997. It also stated that 
Watson would be allowed to remain with Kodak beyond 
March 7, 1997 only if he was successful in obtaining 
another position within the company, an effort with which 
Gagnon professed he would help. Watson failed to find 
another position. Consequently, Kodak terminated his 
employment on March 7, 1997. 
 
Thereafter, Watson was hospitalized briefly in 
Pennsylvania. Upon his release, in June 1997, he traveled 
to Florida where he stayed at his mother's r esidence. While 
in Florida on December 31, 1997, realizing that the 
administrative deadline for filing a discrimination charge 
was about to expire, Watson filed a claim with the EEOC at 
its Miami, Florida branch, alleging violations of T itle VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e 
to 2000e-17, and the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. SS 621 to 634. When hefiled the 
discrimination charge, Watson described the adverse action 
taken against him as follows: 
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       I was employed by Eastman Kodak Company for 
       eighteen years. During that time there wer e several 
       situations revolveing [sic] around pay, assignments to 
       territory and like [sic] of understanding. I believe that 
       my race and age at the time of my termination from 
       [sic] played a roll [sic] in their decision to release me. 
 
The EEOC investigator informed Watson that the claim 
would be processed, then transferred back to Pennsylvania. 
On May 7, 1998, after retaining counsel, W atson filed an 
amended charge in which he added a pay discrimination 
claim. 
 
Relying upon Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 
250 (1980), the District Court concluded that W atson's 
unlawful termination claim accrued on February 4, 1997, 
the date he received Gagnon's letter. Because Watson 
submitted his EEOC charge 330 days later , on December 
31, 1997, the Court determined his claim fell outside the 
statutorily allotted 300 day filing deadline. Consequently, 
the Court granted Kodak summary judgment. 
 
On appeal, Watson argues that the District Court 
misconstrued Ricks and that it erred in failing to conclude 
that his termination claim accrued on Mar ch 7, 1997, 
which is within 300 days of the date he filed his EEOC 
discrimination charge in Florida. He also contends that, 
even if we determine that the termination claim was 
untimely, we should find that his discrimination in 
compensation claim, based on a continuing violation 
theory, was timely. 
 
II. 
 
This Court's review of a grant of summary judgment is 
plenary, and the record is judged by the same standard 
district courts use. Witkowski v. W elch, 173 F.3d 192, 198 
(3d Cir. 1999). Federal Rule of Civil Pr ocedure 56 governs 
summary judgment motions. Subsection 56(c) pr ovides, in 
part, that: 
 
       [t]he judgment sought shall be render ed forthwith if the 
       pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
       admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
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       show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
       fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
       as a matter of law. 
 
The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and 
summary judgment is to be entered if the evidence is such 
that a reasonable fact finder could find only for the moving 
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986); Doherty v. Teamsters Pension T rust Fund, 16 F.3d 
1386, 1389 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
III. 
 
Under Title VII and the ADEA, plaintif fs residing in states 
having an agency authorized to grant relief for federally 
prohibited employment discrimination must r esort to that 
state remedy before they will be allowed access to federal 
judicial relief. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(c) (Title VII); 29 
U.S.C. S 633(b) (ADEA); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 
U.S. 750, 754-58 (1979). Such states are ter med "deferral" 
states. See Evans, 441 U.S. at 758. It is undisputed that 
Pennsylvania is a deferral state. See 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
SS 955(a), 959; Sharpe v. Pennsylvania Hous. Auth., 693 
F.2d 24, 26 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 
Title VII and ADEA plaintiffs such as W atson, who file in 
deferral states, must submit their administrative 
discrimination charge within 300 days of the challenged 
employment action. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e)(1) (Title VII); 
29 U.S.C. S 626(d)(2) (ADEA); Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co., 
935 F.2d 1407, 1413-15 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc). Therefore, 
Watson's attempt to obtain relief under federal law from 
Kodak's alleged employment discrimination on the basis of 
race and age may proceed only if he filed his administrative 
charge of discrimination within 300 days of the unlawful 
employment actions he challenges. 
 
The crucial issue in this case is whether the actionable 
adverse employment decision was the one to separate 
Watson from the position of Account Executive or the one 
to terminate his employment with Kodak entir ely. We begin 
our analysis of the timeliness issue with the Supr eme 
Court's decision in Delaware State College v. Ricks. In 
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Ricks, a professor at Delaware State College challenged the 
college's decision not to grant him tenure as being 
unlawfully based on national origin discrimination. Ricks, 
449 U.S. at 252. The professor pursued inter nal grievance 
procedures within the college to pr otest the tenure denial, 
and in the meantime the college, as it customarily did, 
entered into a one year "terminal" contract with him that 
allowed the professor one extra year of employment before 
his actual termination. Id. at 252-54. 
 
Of primary importance in the case, due to the date the 
professor filed his administrative discrimination charge, 
was the date that his unlawful termination claim accrued. 
See id. at 254-56. The professor ar gued that it accrued on 
the date of his final day of employment under the one-year 
terminal contract. See id. at 257. The Supreme Court 
rejected his theory, ruling instead that his unlawful 
termination claim accrued when he initially r eceived the 
college's notice that he had been denied tenur e. Id. at 259, 
261-62. 
 
The Court emphasized that the key inquiry was 
identifying the precise alleged unlawful employment 
practice. Id. at 257. This was the central issue because the 
relevant federal statute, Title VII, measured the 
administrative charge's timeliness from the date " `the 
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.' " Id. at 256 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e)); accor d 29 U.S.C. 
S 626(d)(2) (for ADEA claims, timeliness of administrative 
charge is measured from date "the alleged unlawful practice 
occurred"). The Supreme Court found it immaterial that the 
professor's denial of tenure did not manifest itself until one 
year later, when his terminal contract expired. See Ricks, 
449 U.S. at 258. The Court instead approved the maxim 
that " `[t]he proper focus is upon the time of the 
discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the 
consequences of the acts became most painful.' " Id. 
(quoting Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 
209 (9th Cir. 1979)). Because the professor's allegations in 
his complaint focused only on his denial of tenur e, the 
Court concluded that the date he was notified of that 
decision controlled. Id. at 257-58 & n.9, 261-62. 
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Watson contends that Ricks is inapplicable. He argues, 
for example, that the unlawful discrimination he challenges 
relates to the termination of his employment from Kodak 
generally, rather than specifically to his dischar ge from the 
position of Account Executive. This argument fails for two 
reasons. First, Watson's amended EEOC charge explicitly 
alleged that "I was discharged from the position of Account 
Executive, from [Kodak]," and it stated in support that he 
"was the only black Account Executive in [his] area, and 
[he] was not receiving support." Second, and more 
importantly, the only evidence of either race or age 
discrimination in the record, found in the various verified 
statements to which Watson attested and that served 
largely to verify his complaint and the allegations in his 
EEOC charges, relates solely to Gagnon's supervision of 
Watson. 
 
In light of these facts, the record does not support 
Watson's argument that he was challenging his termination 
from employment in a general sense, as opposed to his 
termination from the Account Executive position. Just as 
the professor's allegations in Ricks made it clear that he 
was challenging the more specific decision to deny him 
tenure, see 449 U.S. at 257-58, the r ecord in Watson's case 
demonstrates that he was challenging the specific decision 
to remove him from the position of Account Executive. See 
also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 6-8 (1981) 
(rejecting termination date as the r elevant event since no 
allegations of discrimination existed between the date of 
notice of termination and the date of ter mination). 
 
Watson further argues that the date his claim accrued 
cannot be February 4, 1997 because Gagnon's letter left 
open the possibility of continued employment in another 
position with Kodak and therefore it was an equivocal 
notice of termination. Cf. Smith v. United Parcel Serv. of 
Am., Inc., 65 F.3d 266, 268 (2d Cir . 1995) ("the limitation 
period begins to run on the date when the employee 
receives a definite notice of the ter mination. Moreover, for 
the notice to be effective, it must be made apparent to the 
employee that the notice states the official position of the 
employer.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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However, Gagnon's letter cannot be deemed equivocal 
merely because it preserved the possibility of continued 
employment. In Ricks, the professor pursued an internal 
grievance process that might have resulted in his having 
obtained tenure. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 252-54 & n.2, 261-62. 
Despite this action, the Court rejected an ar gument that 
the notice of termination was render ed ambiguous by the 
mere potential for continued employment. See id. at 260- 
61. Therefore, the District Court corr ectly determined that 
Watson's unlawful termination claim r elates specifically to 
his removal from the Account Executive position, and that 
Gagnon's letter of February 4, 1997 unequivocally informed 
Watson of that decision. 
 
At oral argument, Watson claimed that, despite Gagnon's 
letter, he effectively remained in the Account Executive 
position until March 7, 1997, which we must accept as the 
date on which he suffered the adverse employment action. 
However, the last day of employment is not necessarily the 
date of the adverse employment action. For example, in 
Ricks, even though the professor's employment continued 
for one year after he was denied tenure, the Court 
nevertheless refused to equate the last day of his 
employment with the date on which the adverse 
employment action occurred. Id. at 259, 261-62. 
 
Moreover, even if Watson's last day as an Account 
Executive was March 7, 1997, that cannot serve as the date 
of the adverse employment action since Gagnon's letter 
quite clearly informed Watson that, as of February 4, 1997, 
he was terminated from the Account Executive position. 
This is true because it does not matter that W atson was 
notified of his termination several weeks before his ultimate 
discharge. As a matter of law, notice of an"operative 
decision" of termination is not equivocal merely because it 
was "given . . . in advance of a designated date on which 
employment terminated." See Char don, 454 U.S. at 8. 
 
Finally, Watson incorrectly relies on the Ninth Circuit's 
decision in the case of Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211 (9th 
Cir. 1991). In Bouman, the plaintif f, a female police officer, 
instituted a Title VII action against Los Angeles County and 
the county's sheriff's department, alleging inter alia that the 
department engaged in gender discrimination by 
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intentionally failing to promote her. Id. at 1221. Under 
department procedures, eligibility for pr omotion was 
determined by the results of a ser geant's examination. 
Exam scores were used to develop a pr omotion list, which 
then served as the basis for promotion within the 
department for two years. Id. at 1217. After failing to 
receive a promotion during the list's two-year term, the 
plaintiff instituted employment discrimination proceedings. 
She filed an administrative charge within 300 days of the 
expiration of the promotion list, but well beyond 300 days 
from the date of the examination and the establishment of 
the list. In assessing the timeliness of the claimfiled, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the claim accrued when the 
promotion list expired, not when the pr omotion list was 
established or the promotion exam was given. Id. at 1221. 
The Bouman Court distinguished Ricks because there, the 
professor's "termination . . . was a delayed but inevitable 
result of being denied tenure." Id.  In Bouman's case, by 
contrast, it was not certain that the petitioner would not be 
promoted until the list had expired. She did not know until 
that date that she had suffered an injury. 
 
Watson argues that Bouman, rather than Ricks, controls 
because when he received Gagnon's February 4, 1997 
letter, his termination from the Account Executive position 
was not a delayed but inevitable result since he might have 
remained in that position in another part of the company. 
Consequently, Watson argues that his termination claim 
must be deemed to have accrued on March 7, 1997. 
However, Watson ignores that in Bouman, the plaintiff's 
failure to be promoted had not been inevitable because 
(1) she was on the promotion list, (2) she was at the top of 
the list when it expired, and (3) vacancies had occurred 
before the list expired to which she could have been 
promoted. Id. at 1217. Thus, in Bouman, the plaintiff's 
potential promotion was not based on mer e speculation. By 
contrast, Watson's contention that his r emoval from the 
Account Executive position was not an inevitable r esult of 
Gagnon's letter rests on pure speculation. Under these 
circumstances, Watson's case is mor e analogous to Ricks 
than Bouman, since the professor in Ricks relied on mere 
speculation that his internal grievance concer ning the 
tenure decision would be successful. See also Bronze 
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Shields Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 
1080-84 (3d Cir. 1981) (when plaintif fs challenged legality 
of hiring examination, claim accrued when they r eceived 
notice that they had failed the examination and wer e not on 
the hiring roster, not when roster expired). 
 
Therefore, we agree with the District Court that Watson's 
claim centered on his termination fr om the Account 
Executive position, and that Gagnon's February 1997 letter 
clearly informed Watson of his dischar ge from that position. 
The letter stated that "as of January 1, 1997 you are no 
longer in the Account Executive position." Consequently, 
pursuant to Ricks, the District Court corr ectly held that 
Watson's termination claim accrued on February 4, 1997, 
the date he received Gagnon's letter. As a result, Watson's 
discrimination discharge claim is untimely. 
 
IV. 
 
Watson also seeks review of his claim that Kodak 
unlawfully compensated him at a lower rate than similarly 
situated white employees. The District Court did not 
discuss this issue in its initial summary judgment decision. 
However, the Court did address the issue in ruling on 
Watson's motion for reconsideration. First, it declared that 
"all of Watson's claims related to any Kodak decision about 
which he was notified on February 4, 1997 ar e time- 
barred." Second, the Court held that "[a] reasonable reading 
of" his December 31, 1997 EEOC discrimination charge 
"does not lead to a conclusion that he was complaining 
about race discrimination in his rate of pay." The Court 
also concluded that its prior grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Kodak on this issue was proper because Watson 
"presented no evidence on summary judgment that 
suggests that Kodak engaged in some conduct that might 
qualify as a continuing violation." 
 
Even assuming that Watson presented a timely unlawful 
compensation claim to the EEOC, the District Court's 
ruling on this issue must be affirmed because Watson failed 
to identify any evidence that he was compensated at a 
lower rate than similarly situated employees, or that this 
alleged disparate compensation continued long enough to 
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have rendered his December 31, 1997 EEOC charge timely. 
For example, he failed to identify through extrinsic evidence 
his pay rate, or those of comparable employees, and he 
provided no evidence of the last date he r eceived a 
paycheck. Although Watson filed an affidavit to support his 
opposition to Kodak's summary judgment motion, he 
makes no reference to an unlawful compensation claim nor 
does he aver any facts to support it. Therefor e, since 
Watson failed to make the requir ed evidentiary showing to 
sustain his unlawful compensation claim, the District Court 
properly entered summary judgment. See  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(e). A party's failure to make a showing that is "sufficient 
to establish the existence of an element essential to that 
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden 
of proof at trial" mandates the entry of summary judgment. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also 
J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1531 
(3d Cir. 1990). 
 
V. 
 
For all the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
District Court's order. 
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